# Herald Investment Trust NAV per share growth reached 27.5% for year end

- Link: https://www.directorstalkinterviews.com/herald-investment-trust-nav-per-share-growth-reached-27-5-for-year-end/412805910
- Published: 2020-02-19T07:34:24+00:00
- Author: Giles Arbor

**Herald Investment Trust plc** (LON:HRI) annual financial report for the year ended
31st Dec 2019.

**Results and dividend**

The net asset value (NAV) of the Company at 31 December 2019 was 1,668.1p per ordinary
share (2018 – 1,307.9p). This represented an increase of 27.5% during the year. 
The discount was 11.3% (2018: 17.8%) and the share price increased by 37.7% to 1,480.0p.

The Company made a revenue profit of £31,000 (2018: £58,000) giving net earnings
of 0.05p per share (2018: 0.08p) per share. The directors do not recommend a dividend(
2018 – nil) for the year ended 31 December 2019.

The financial information set out in this Annual Financial Report does not constitute
the Company’s statutory accounts for 2018 or 2019. Statutory accounts for the years
ended 31 December 2018 and 31 December 2019 have been reported on by the Independent
Auditor. The Independent Auditors’ Reports on the annual report and financial statements
for 2018 and 2019 were unqualified, did not draw attention to any matters by way
of emphasis, and did not contain a statement under 498(2) or 498(3) of the Companies
Act 2006. The Company’s statutory accounts for the year ended 31 December 2018 have
been filed with the Registrar of Companies. The Company’s statutory accounts for
the year ended 31 December 2019 will be delivered to the Registrar in due course.

The financial information in this Annual Financial Report has been prepared using‘
FRS 102 The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland’(
FRS102), which forms part of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (‘UK GAAP’) 
issued by the Financial Reporting Council. The financial statements have also been
prepared in accordance with The Companies Act 2006 and with the Statement of Recommended
Practice ‘Financial Statements of Investment Trust Companies and Venture Capital
Trusts’ issued by the Association of Investment Companies (‘AIC’) in October 2019.

**CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT AND REVIEW OF 2019**

**PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE**

At the mid-year, we reported that the net asset value per share (“NAV”) had grown
17.2%. By the year end, the Company’s NAV per share growth had reached 27.5%. The
growth in NAV for the year, which compares favourably with wider indices, reflected
strong equity markets globally and good stock selection.

Of note was an unusually sharp divergence in performance between larger and smaller
companies within our overall smaller companies remit: larger companies performed
materially better than smaller ones. To illustrate this, the Company’s investments
with a market capitalisation in excess of $1bn at the year end had delivered a total
return of 56.5%, with the investments with a market capitalisation below $1bn returning
the lower but still good figure of 19.1%.

There is degree to which this divergence reflects success, because the good performers
have grown; but the more significant factor this year is a much greater re-rating
in the valuation basis. A crude measure of some relevance is the Bloomberg forecast
of Enterprise Value to Sales: it is 5.0x on average for the holdings above $1bn,
whereas the average for companies below $1bn is 2.8x.

The most significant effect on performance is provided by the UK, which accounts
for 52.2% of the Company’s total assets and has a much lower average market capitalisation.
The total return from our UK portfolio was 30.2% which compares favourably with 
the Numis Smaller Companies Index plus AIM (ex investment companies) which returned
22.2%. Nevertheless, this market has not felt like a bull market at all because 
liquidity has been so poor. Indeed, volumes in AIM technology stocks across the 
market have fallen 70% over the last year. In a normal market cycle, we would expect
the performance to filter down to much smaller companies in 2020 and 2019 should
have been a good year for new issues, however it was not. The UK market had a double
headwind; firstly political uncertainty which was significantly alleviated by the
election because the UK portfolio appreciated 7.8% in December; secondly a withdrawal
from illiquid assets, or at least avoidance of smaller companies, partly due to 
the regulatory shock of MiFID II and other issues. The latter may have an ongoing
effect, which we have to monitor closely. However, the performance figures should
reassure investors that shrinking markets can still be rewarding.

The North American region has delivered the strongest overall return reflecting 
a greater skew to the larger end of the remit. The total return from the North American
portfolio was 39.5% versus the Russell 2000 (Small Cap) Technology Index (in sterling
terms) returning 29.7%. It is interesting to observe that the large capitalisation
Russell 1000 Technology Index returned 41.5%, so again smaller companies have materially
underperformed their bigger brethren, but it is pleasing to have performed nearly
as well as that latter index which is dominated by Apple and Microsoft, when they
have performed so well. It is also pleasing that the UK performance, in spite of
the microcap challenges has exceeded that of the US Russell 2000 Technology Index.
Remarkably there were £62m in takeovers in the Company’s North America portfolio,
some of which have not completed, which is extraordinary versus a market value of
£218m at the start of the year.

The Company’s total return in Europe was 38.9% with three-quarters of the region’s
return by value coming from the three biggest holdings, BE Semiconductor, Data Respons
and Nordic Semiconductor. The Asian total return was 29.3% with a particularly strong
performance from Taiwan of 51.5%.

Cash has been a drag on the overall return. Cash levels were higher than planned
at the start of 2019 reflecting a spate of takeovers, and a further £106m of takeovers
have been announced during 2019. In both the UK and North America portfolios, sales
exceeded purchases, and modest net cash was invested in EMEA and Asia. There were
no completed takeovers in those regions, though by the year end one significant 
holding, Data Respons, agreed a takeover, which has not yet completed. Reinvestment
has been measured and the Manager has taken profits in a number of holdings reflecting
full valuations.

During the year share buyback transactions amounted to £20.3m or 2.3% of the equity
outstanding at an average price (including costs) of £12.79 per share.

**BOARD COMPOSITION AND GOVERNANCE**

As anticipated at this time last year, Julian Cazalet retired from the board of 
the Company at the conclusion of the annual general meeting in April 2019 having
chaired the board for ten years. We are very grateful for his leadership and his
very substantial contribution to the Company’s success.

Henrietta Marsh joined the board in September, bringing investment management background,
with a particular focus on smaller companies, to further strengthen the board’s 
expertise.

The Company undertook an audit tender process in 2019 and is pleased to report that
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP were appointed as auditor to the Company and have undertaken
the 2019 audit.

**OUTLOOK**

Valuations are not as attractive as they have been, but the sector is still dynamic,
and we believe continues to offer better opportunities than the wider market. The
microcap end of the market offers conspicuously more interesting valuations. The
closed-end nature of an investment trust makes it an ideal vehicle to access the
Company’s target market.

Ian Russell
Chairman

18 February 2020

**INVESTMENT MANAGER’S REPORT**

After a year of consolidation in 2018, I was confident that 2019 would be better,
but candidly I am surprised by quite how strong the market has been. I was particularly
apprehensive in the middle of the year when I was aware how dire liquidity was, 
particularly in the UK and Europe.

As Woodford’s troubles emerged there was a spate of selling as investors tried to
reduce holdings in illiquid stocks and the market was scarcely functioning. I feared
distressed sellers would deliver a downward dislocation. Fortunately, the Woodford
situation occurred against a very strong market background; otherwise, more damage
could have been done.

Why, I wonder, has the market been so strong? I believe the main reason is that,
while there is a shortage of capital in smaller quoted companies, there is a surplus
in the hands of private equity. They are using cheap debt to leverage returns and
exploit the anomaly that interest is tax deductible when dividends are not. They
continue to pay significant premiums when acquiring quoted companies and gradually
the quoted market is moving to their valuation levels. They have gathered assets
by performing with leverage, which has worked in an era of declining and very low
real interest rates.

From first principles, the ideal environment is for companies to have permanent 
capital and for investors to have perfect liquidity. That worked in the stock market
and for the wider economy as well over extended periods. On the other hand, private
equity is temporary capital, with short-term horizons, which while possibly driving
markets higher in the short-term, will over time tend to undermine economies as 
more ownership goes into its hands.

The move to private equity ownership has been helped by the huge increase in costs
and distraction from spiralling regulation in public markets, which is particularly
onerous for developing businesses. For example, I estimate that of the 131 UK listed
investments in the portfolio each has spent an additional £50,000 on investor relations
by appointing a joint broker, commissioning independent research or, in extremis,
employing an individual to do investor relations. On average Herald owns 4.2% of
the outstanding capital of its UK holdings, so the share of those costs borne by
our investors is c£275,000. This is a hidden cost not disclosed to investors. At
the same time, we now have 17 holdings with no broker coverage, a further 64 with
access to only one broker (including our largest US holding Pegasystems) and a further
62 holdings with access to research from only two brokers. This anecdote perhaps
explains why MiFID II research payments are so confusing and challenging for us 
and why some investors and brokers are disappearing from the smaller companies’ 
scene.

Similarly, audit fees are leaping, and it seems too much time is spent counting 
the blades of grass without intelligently viewing the lawn. We are jealous of the
minimal scrutiny of the private equity world, but maybe in time investors will realise
that minimal regulation is not ideal either. Wealth managers are facing ever increasing
costs, which now have to be paid out of after-tax income when previously more of
the cost was ascribed to capital. None but the richest investors can now afford 
tailor-made advice. When costs were pro-rata to dealing more of the cost was born
by big investors and less by small investors.

In recent years the stock markets in the UK and the US have not provided the stable
quality ownership that they did in the past and have not supported the UK technology
sector. The quality long-term owners of defined benefit pension schemes and insurance
companies have disappeared and the ebbs and flows of open-ended funds make them 
unstable shareholders for small companies. As allocations to quoted UK equities 
have fallen, investors have too easily accepted takeovers and failed to provide 
capital for companies to grow. In this challenging environment for smaller public
companies, Herald has been a steadfast supporter of technology businesses. We have
been made insiders for secondary fund raisings over 100 times in 2019 and we have
participated in 62 placings with an aggregate value of £40m. There were other occasions
when we would have participated or invested more had there been more co-investors
as we are disciplined in ensuring that we generally do not exceed 10% ownership 
of the outstanding share capital. I am sure flows into passive investments are driving
up some valuations; for liquidity reasons they should not and generally do not invest
in smaller companies, but it is another slug of capital no longer available for 
small quoted companies. Clearly, they do not participate in new issues, nor in pricing
shares efficiently.

On a more positive note there is relative value in the smallest companies. Capital
is still hard to find where it is needed most, which is for emerging companies who
have not yet reached profitability where venture capital has significantly lower
cash to deploy compared to leveraged private equity. Furthermore, US investors, 
appreciating the value in the UK, are beginning to appear on the share registers
of the smaller UK quoted companies, which may be the lifeline needed. I am reassured
that the SEC has extended the exemption which allows US brokers to sell research
to European firms by three years. There are therefore the building blocks in place,
of attractive valuations and increasing capital availability, for a positive investment
environment.

I remember when I started in the City during Thatcher’s reign the atmosphere was“
we need small companies to create wealth, added value jobs, taxes and future big
companies”, and there was an enthusiasm to allocate capital accordingly. It is within
the Government’s powers to direct UK savings to alleviate the disastrous decisions
made over the last twenty years: after all, they provide a subsidy to pensions, 
ISAs and private equity. Now that we have left the EU, there is an opportunity for
government to create a really positive environment for innovation and growth.

**UK**

The UK portfolio has returned 30.2%, outperforming the Numis Smaller Companies Index
plus AIM (ex investment companies) (the “Numis Index”) by 8%. The return from stocks
with a market capitalisation exceeding $1bn was 77.3% which has driven the outperformance
and was over 60% better than the smaller UK companies in the Company’s portfolio.
I note that fully listed UK stocks returned 54.5% and AIM stocks delivered 21.6%,
so the bigger stocks in AIM contributed very strongly and I conclude that neither
AIM nor politics is the issue, but rather the flight of capital from illiquid smaller
companies. Of the top 73 holdings in the Company with a market capitalisation of
over $1bn only 17 are in the UK with a market value of £185.4m but a book cost of
only £41.7m. Therefore, on average, they have risen 4.5x, many having started as
microcaps in the portfolio.

The number of takeovers in the UK was eight with an aggregate value of £38.1m which
is a lower rate than recent years, being only 8.1% of the UK portfolio at the start
of 2019. The most significant takeover was Statpro, in which the Company had an 
11% stake. We went above our customary 10% threshold when they could not draw on
their overdraft facility when Kaupthing went bankrupt. We, along with Statpro’s 
Directors, provided emergency funding. We first invested in May 2000 in an early
stage IPO when it was a struggle to find value in the technology bubble. I am sorry
to see the company go, but pleased to say the return over the life of the holding
is 1,018.5%. Of the cumulative £13.8m total return over the history of the holding,
£9.2m was in 2019 with the takeover premium. People detached from investing may 
ask “why did you not buy them at the beginning of 2019”? Two reasons. Firstly, an
11% stake would not have been available and, secondly, the company would not have
floated and survived if we had not provided it with necessary capital. Unfortunately,
there are not enough other long-term investors around. I suspect there were few 
technology investments made in May 2000 that delivered that sort of return, albeit
over nearly 20 years. Scisys was another company where Herald was the largest outside
shareholder with an 8.2% stake. It is under offer, as is Sophos.

The star performers have been GB Group and Future which both returned more than 
£20m during the year and have been strong long-term performers, dwarfing the disappointments
from M&C Saatchi and LoopUp.

There are currently a few unlisted holdings with an aggregate value of £15.1m. Some
are unlisted securities which are convertible into quoted ones (35.7% of £15.1m)
and others are previously quoted companies that have delisted (11.2% Fusionex and
Celoxica). There are two further private companies which are also held within Herald
Ventures, Natilik and Antenova, accounting for 19.8%. Both are profitable and paying
dividends. The board has approved a limited scope to invest in private companies
and we have a natural flow of opportunities. If we believe better returns can be
achieved here, we would consider asking directors and shareholders for greater flexibility
but have no current plans to do so. The remaining private investment is the holding
in the management company.

Since inception the UK has been the core driver of the Company’s performance, but
over the last five years the UK has lagged the returns from North America and Europe.
Even so, the total return in the UK has been 105.5% over that period, while the 
Numis Index has returned 52.4% and the AIM Technology Index a similar amount.

**North America**

The North American portfolio’s return (in sterling terms) was 39.5%, some 10% ahead
of the Russell 2000 Technology Index. Smaller companies in the US materially underperformed
the Company’s overall return for many years post the technology bubble of 2000, 
but have outperformed from 2014. The Company’s North American portfolio has returned
171.4% (in sterling terms) over the last five years, with the Russell 2000 Technology
Index returning 135.4% over the same period: 36.0% ahead. The total return of the
large company Russell 1000 Technology Index has returned 181.4%.

I should be thrilled if we can sustain that degree of outperformance, but a legitimate
question is why we have not had a higher US weighting. There were two factors: takeovers
and valuations.

At the beginning of 2015, the value of the North American portfolio was £144m and,
by coincidence, the aggregate value of US takeovers in the last five years has also
been £144m. Of that, £62m is the value of takeovers in 2019 alone, including Mellanox
and Fitbit which have not yet completed. Some 20.4% of the North American portfolio
at the start of 2019 has been acquired in the last year. The significant takeovers
were Attunity (£17.3m), Mellanox (£16.8m), Amber Road (£9.4m), Hydrogenics (£6.7m)
and Quantenna (£5.4m). We took an initial position in Attunity in 2014, and the 
Company cornerstoned a secondary offering in December 2017 investing $4.75m, which
I had the confidence to do having known the management with a modest holding for
three years. The take-out price of $23.5 per share, by private equity house Thoma
Bravo seems a good return in just over a year, but one of my colleagues saw them
at a Gartner conference recently and exclaimed on his return that we were robbed,
because revenues had grown 100%.

We are sad to be losing Mellanox as well. The total return has been 9x the initial
book cost and the exit valuation is somewhat disappointing. It takes time and patience
to find similar opportunities.

As well as losing some holdings to takeovers in North America, we took profits in
some where we believed that the stocks had run too far. In aggregate we sold £67m
of North American stocks, offset by £30m of purchases. The cash from sales and takeovers
has come in with the market at elevated levels, and we believe that there will be
better buying opportunities in the US. Private equity is sweeping up value, but 
some of the momentum stocks in the SAAS (software as a service) area were on uncomfortably
high valuations with EV/sales values as high as 30x. There is a resourcing bubble
in California and stock-based compensation, meaning free shares, are being liberally
doled out, but normally stripped out of “adjusted EPS” numbers. There were signs
in the second half that the market is beginning to worry about this too and valuations
have corrected a little. Analysts almost never take account of share-based payments
in earnings forecasts, which means there is a material overstatement of earnings
and therefore understatement of the P/E ratio. This is a particular problem in the
software sector, but not in semiconductors. I am therefore unsurprised that semiconductors
have performed relatively well.

There are 22 stocks in the portfolio with an aggregate value of £170m which exceed
$3bn market capitalisation, which is the level above which we do not make new or
further investments. Of these, 13 are in North America with an aggregate value of
£95.5m which is an anomalously large proportion (37%) of the North American portfolio.
The aggregate cost base for these holdings is only £19.3m, so the average return
is nearly 5x. In addition, £14m profit has been realised already. The star performers
have been Pegasystems, Mellanox, Descartes and Five9. LivePerson and Hydrogenics
are smaller companies which have contributed strongly this year.

The high levels of takeovers in the Company’s North American market investment universe
has been reflected in a sharp decline in the number of listed technology companies
because takeovers have exceeded IPOs. At the beginning of 2019 the number of stocks
in the Bloomberg Communications and Technology sectors in the United States with
a market capitalisation >$20m and <$3bn was 616 and this had fallen to 535 by the
year end, albeit the number of companies above $3bn market capitalisation had grown
from 235 to 267. The trend in recent years has been for venture backed companies
to have more fund raising rounds pre-IPO. The much discussed “Unicorns” such as 
Uber, Airbnb, Slack, WeWork et al were private companies raising money with rounds
at >$1bn valuation.

It is interesting that some of these have crawled to market in a dull way or failed
to IPO. Those private valuations were too high. Furthermore, Spotify and Slack pioneered
an introduction to the market without a fund raising. Slack’s share price, for example,
reached $38.6 when it first listed and traded at $22 at the year-end. It still has
a market value way above our smaller companies remit at $12.4bn, which is eye-watering
compared to forecast sales of $622m for the year to March 2020 and a huge loss-making
margin of over 20% of EBIT. Presumably some of the stock has been acquired by passive
investors? These late stage venture investors must be careful to leave something
on the table to attract public investors or exits will be difficult. Examples like
this may make the pre-IPO fashion fade, while leveraged private equity will stumble
when interest rates rise.

**EMEA**

The European portfolio had a tricky year in 2018 led by the semiconductor downturn(
including the largest holding BE Semiconductor Industries), but 2019 has seen a 
good recovery. The total return for 2019 was 38.9% and over 5 years it has been 
181% in sterling terms, which makes it the best performing region. Data Respons 
is a Norwegian holding acquired in 2014 and a French company Akka has agreed to 
acquire it. It is a pity to lose a holding with a known and respected management
team, but it has helped short-term performance.

**Asia**

The Asian portfolio has returned 29.3% in sterling terms this year and 78.3% over
5 years. Within the year, the Kosdaq IT Index in Korea rose 6.3%, the larger company
TWSE Electronics Index in Taiwan increased 40.8% and the Mothers General Small Companies
Index in Japan was up 8.9%. Performance across the Asian indices was disparate between
countries and between the first and second half of the year.

In general, China and Hong Kong equity markets had a volatile and challenging year
due to the negative impact on GDP of Trump’s tariff war with China and the civil
disturbance in Hong Kong. The Australian market had a stellar start to the year 
rising around 50% in sterling terms by mid July 2019 before giving up a decent proportion
of these gains by the year end. By contrast the TWSE Electronic Index (the “TWSEE
Index”) had modest gains in the first half but rose strongly in the second half 
to return 40.8% for the full year – one of the highest returns from any index worldwide.
The Taiwanese portfolio holdings surpassed the TWSEE Index with a 51.5% return in
the year. The stock market excitement in Taiwan is focused around two concepts; 
firstly the adoption of 5G wireless technology increasing the demand for Taiwanese
hardware and semiconductors and secondly demand for components from Chinese companies
desperate to switch away from American suppliers as a result of the US-China trade
war. As with all concepts the reality can disappoint and with a number of the Taiwanese
holdings near record valuations there is a temptation to realise some gains. The
biggest contribution in the year came from Realtek, a Taiwanese semiconductor company
that benefitted from strong demand for its RF semiconductors, particularly for use
in wireless audio earbuds.

The approach within the Asian portfolio is to continue to diversify away from the
hardware business models common in Korea and Taiwan by unearthing opportunities 
and allocating capital to interesting small companies in countries such as Australia
and Japan, both of which have a good flow of IPOs coming to market.

**Sector Background**

We remain enthusiastic about the outlook for investing in the technology sector.
Cloud computing and ubiquitous connectivity will continue to drive disruption across
different sectors, creating opportunities for technology companies. Although we 
expect trade tensions and regulatory concerns to continue to cause short-term volatility,
ultimately the sector is among the few which is investing heavily in innovation,
creating high value employment and bringing benefits to consumers, enterprises and
governments around the world and generating attractive returns in the process.

The concept of IT as a utility has been talked about since the mid 1990s. However,
it was with the wide acceptance of opensource software post 2000, the availability
of mobile data networks in the mid-2000s, the launch of Amazon’s AWS in 2006 and
the launch of the Apple App store in 2008 that the pieces of the puzzle were in 
place for the concept to go mainstream. Today we call that utility model “Cloud 
Computing.”

We are 10+ years into the adoption of Cloud Computing. The size of the market is
very large but growth rates remain robust. Gartner Group estimate Public Cloud revenues
to grow from $227bn in 2019 to over $350bn in 2022 (source: Gartner). Moreover, 
we see the adoption of Cloud Computing disrupting about $1tr of the current annual
spending on legacy systems.

The move to Cloud Computing is disproportionately beneficial for smaller companies.
It gives them access to a global resilient IT infrastructure at arguably less than
1% of cost of having to build it themselves, and the added benefit that they can
flexibly scale their businesses up and down efficiently and with low risk. Additionally,
this allows small companies to target niche markets around the world efficiently.

In the same way that the internet democratised information flow and we are still
grappling with its second and third order effects, Cloud Computing and Ubiquitous
Connectivity continue to democratise software development across different end markets
with changing second and third order effects.

Investing in technology gives us a front seat to see the ripples and aftershocks
of seemingly unconnected small innovations which often combine to create tectonic
shifts across different industries. Regardless of the source of the innovations,
smaller companies and the entrepreneurs behind them tend to be the first ones to
exploit the nascent opportunities throughout global supply chains.

With time and relentlessly excellent execution, leaders emerge to dominate fragmented,
newly created markets. This has been the story of most of the tech titans of today,
e.g. Microsoft, Apple, TSMC, Google, Facebook, Amazon, ASML and SAP. We have seen
this pattern repeated again and again over the last three decades. We do not see
any sign of it changing in the foreseeable future.

**Environmental Impact**

In a world of limited resources and growing environmental and social concerns, it
is worth highlighting that a number of the technology companies have taken it upon
themselves to be standard-bearers, raising the environmental and social bars for
all. For example, Apple is using 100% renewable energy for all of the electricity
used by its facilities around the world and is striving to make products using 100%
recycled and renewable materials.

Apple imposes its own exacting standards on all of its suppliers and the suppliers
of their suppliers. Apple’s lead in this area has spurred others such as Google,
Microsoft, Amazon to also up their efforts. So although the US government, driven
by corporate lobbies, drags its feet on environmental commitments, this has not 
stopped the leading US technology companies from rapidly raising standards across
their supply chains around the world. This leads small companies which are customers
and/or suppliers of the large companies to also become progressively more environmentally
efficient.

“We’re sourcing 100% renewable energy for all the electricity used at our facilities
in 43 countries around the world. Two thirds of this renewable energy comes from
Apple-created projects.”

“We take responsibility for our entire carbon footprint. That includes the emissions
beyond our direct control, like those from sourcing materials, making our products,
and our customers using their devices.”

“Partners across our supply chain are installing or investing in sizable solar projects
and purchasing clean energy directly from renewable projects or from their utility.
As of April 2019, 44 manufacturing partners in 16 countries have committed to 100%
renewable energy for Apple production”

**Apple Environmental Responsibility Report, 2019**

**Coronavirus**

The technology sector will be significantly affected if Coronavirus continues to
disrupt manufacturing in China. Although the direct exposure to Chinese companies
is minimal, the indirect effect could be significant. In particular, a handful of
holdings in each region manufacture products there, either with Chinese operations,
or through subcontractors and suppliers, and many more companies use PCs and servers
which are at least in part manufactured there. However, the knock-on effects will
be felt in many sectors if the cessation of production is prolonged, and at this
stage that is uncertain.

**Prospects**

We remain confident that there is growth in the sector above that of the wider economy
and that much of the sector now has non-cyclical spending. In particular, the recurring
revenues associated with IT infrastructure and applications, used by corporations,
the consumer and governments alike, have the defensive characteristics of utilities
without the regulatory issues, which benefit so many companies within our universe.
However, the geopolitical uncertainties, the illiquidity associated with smaller
companies and valuation levels which will be vulnerable when interest rates rise,
means that we prefer to keep higher than normal cash levels to ensure we can exploit
buying opportunities, which will inevitably occur. For reassurance, valuations are
in general not in bubble territory and the difficulty which central banks have in
raising interest rates means there is a good chance that valuations could rise further.

Katie Potts

Fund Manager

18 February 2020

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